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Economic Developments in Tajikistan by Tyler Haupert 
Abstract:  
 Poor nations often leave countless young males without an education, a stable 
family, or a strong government to follow. These conditions make the choice to join a 
group of religious radicals appealing. Tajikistan, a country of over seven million located 
just north of Afghanistan in Central Asia, is surrounded by war torn, politically unstable 
neighbors and fits the profile of a hotbed for religious radicalism. While the country has 
avoided a large-scale international war, political instability and economic deficiencies 
have left Tajikistan primed for future conflict. The situation presents an intriguing study 
for those concerned with humanitarian issues and those involved in security matters alike. 
This in-depth inspection of the state’s complex economy reveals areas of great concern 
along with reasons for optimism. 
 
Economic Developments in Tajikistan 
 
Tajikistan is a nation in which a civil war and blatant government corruption have 
gone largely unnoticed by Western eyes. However, the country is located in the center of 
a region of great martial and economic importance to the United States and Western 
Europe. Its neighbor to the west, Uzbekistan, recently forced a U.S. military base off its 
territory. Iraq, a small distance southwest of Tajikistan is currently rebuilding its 
government while attempting to avoid civil war. Additionally, Afghanistan, directly to 
the south, remains occupied by U.S. troops. Tajikistan itself has the potential to become a 
focus of international attention for reasons other than its troubled neighbors. Poor Islamic 
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 nations frequently leave countless young males without an education, a stable family, or a 
strong government to follow. These conditions make the choice to join a band of 
religious radicals appealing; such groups provide social networks, access to food and 
shelter, and a sense of purpose. In this context an understanding of Tajikistan’s economy 
becomes significant to any organization or individual concerned with violence and 
terrorism across the globe. The country’s combination of governmental corruption, a 
largely uneducated youth, and severe poverty creates a volatile atmosphere that merits 
attention from both humanitarian and international security entities.  
Since the Central Asian states gained their independence in 1991, much ink has 
been spilled regarding their economic development as both independent nations and as a 
collective region. While Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan possess significant oil resources, 
Uzbekistan boasts a sizeable industrial infrastructure, and Kyrgyzstan has implemented 
aggressive economic reform since the breakup of the Soviet Union, little progress has 
taken place in Tajikistan. In a region that would have been content to preserve the 
adjusted Soviet Union suggested by Gorbachev rather than be forced into independence, 
Tajikistan has experienced the most difficulty sustaining stable nationhood.1 However, 
despite being plagued by corruption, insufficient infrastructure, unfriendly neighbors and 
a crippling drug trade, the nation’s economy is not beyond repair. This essay will provide 
a brief background of Tajikistan’s current government and an assessment of the bloody 
civil war that, among other things, played a large part in placing the nation in its current 
state of poverty. Subsequently, a discussion of more specific issues affecting 
contemporary Tajikistani economy will be undertaken culminating in remarks on the 
country’s fiscal outlook as well as some suggestions for future action.   
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Civil War, Rahmonov, and Poverty 
  
Like the regimes in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the Tajikistani government has 
been criticized for its lack of transparency. However, in contrast to its neighbors to the 
west, Tajikistan did not initially fall from Moscow’s hands into those of a powerful 
leader. Within a year of declaring its independence Tajikistan plunged into a devastating 
civil war that not only killed between 60,000 to 100,000 people, but was responsible for 
the destruction of much of the nation’s economic infrastructure.2 The war lasted from 
1992 to 1997, and output dropped drastically during that time period. Due to a 
combination of deterioration, war-related destruction, and outright theft, “,manufacturing 
output in 1997 was only 27% and agricultural output 50% of the 1990 level”.3 During the 
span of 1991-1996, Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined at an average 
rate of 17% annually, before reporting modest growth between 1996 and 1999.4 
Additionally, many government officials previously responsible for the oversight of the 
nation’s economy were killed or expelled during the war, leaving command to the 
inexperienced. Thus, Tajikistan was left with a damaged infrastructure which disabled its 
once thriving agricultural industry, and a largely inexperienced administration. 
 As the war finally came to an end in 1997, a new president obtained complete 
control over Tajikistan. Emomali Rahmonov, a supposed democrat, brought corruption 
and further instability to the Tajikistanis, but, if nothing else, gave the nation a center of 
authority to follow. Rahmonov took little discretion when appointing individuals to 
numerous government positions. Rather than seeking qualified persons, the president 
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 appointed those who had supported him during the war while marginalizing those who 
had not. A prime example of Rahmonov’s irresponsible appointments can be found in 
Ghaffor Mirzoyev, who was given the position of head of the Tajik Drug Control Agency 
in 2004. Less than a year later Mirzoyev was arrested for charges including illegal 
possession of weapons, tax evasion, and murder.5 The Tajikistani government not only 
has trouble controlling its citizens, as drug trafficking and tax evasion are major 
problems, but the recklessness of its administrative appointments results in lawlessness in 
positions where political stability is sorely needed. 
 While the economic performance of Tajikistan has been poor, the rate of poverty 
among citizens is equally, if not more alarming. Although accurate statistics are difficult 
to gather, nearly 65% of the population is believed to live in poverty.6 While this is a 
marked improvement since 1999, when poverty was estimated at over 80%, the spread of 
reduction has been uneven, with the population in the Ferghana Valley experiencing a 
much slower decline.7 To put these numbers into perspective, per capita income in 
Tajikistan is currently less than $1 per day, and is anticipated to grow to only $375 per 
year by 2015.8 Thus, Tajikistanis are not expected to climb out of the ranks of the poorest 
nations in the world anytime soon. 
 
Issues 
The overwhelming rate of poverty in Tajikistan is the result of more multifaceted 
troubles than an irresponsible president and a civil war. The war did, however, put the 
nation almost a decade behind in trying to cope with the added responsibilities of 
independence. Today the economy in Tajikistan is characterized by problems in the 
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 domestic market, a weak infrastructure, and complex foreign relations. Some of these 
issues, however, present hope and the possibility for improvement in the lives of 
Tajikistan’s populace. 
 
Trade: Internal and External 
  
The demand for internal commerce in Tajikistan is increasing. Unfortunately, the 
government has been largely unable to tax this trade. This is in part due to the great 
increase in informal services, which are very challenging to record, much less tax.9 
Difficulty collecting taxes is further perpetuated by the incidence of tax evasion. Imports 
are to be taxed between 5% and 7.7%, according to the Eurasian Economic Community. 
However, under-invoicing—an evasive method in which importers report only a portion 
of the goods they receive—likely costs the Tajikistani government between $250 million 
and $300 million each year in revenue.10 Dushanbe simply lacks the resources to strictly 
enforce its tax policy and it pays dearly for this insufficiency. The sum of revenue lost 
from tax evasion is significant as it amounts to over 20% of Tajikistan’s yearly GDP of 
roughly $1.3 billion. The nation must find a way to better handle its own trade before it 
can sufficiently cope with its growing need for international commerce. 
 Tajikistan’s external sector is vulnerable due to its reliance on a small number of 
products. Combined, cotton and aluminum account for over 80% of the nation’s 
exports.11 The third largest export, hydroelectricity, is plagued by poor infrastructure and 
sluggish construction of new plants. The export sector is growing, but an increased 
internal need for previously exported products will cause the nation to accumulate an 
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 average account deficit increase of over $70 million during the next decade. On a more 
positive note, foreign direct investment is expected to accrue slowly, but steadily, due to 
an improving external policy environment. This will help Tajikistan begin to climb its 
way out of debt.12 Though currently working with a trade deficit, the import-to-export 
ratio will continue to improve in the near future. Taxes and trade, however, will remain 
problematic issues if Tajikistan is unable to improve administrative capabilities and gain 
control over a number of its industries. 
 
Farming 
  
The agricultural industry in Tajikistan is the nations largest, and it accounts for 
the majority of lower class citizens’ employment. The industry, however, has been 
plagued with problems since the beginning of the civil war. Farm privatization is among 
the most talked about issues hindering the Tajikistani economy. Although farm land was 
officially privatized in 2001, private land has been illegally given to government officials 
or people with connections to the local land distribution committees.13 Though 
illegitimate, these practices continue due to the government’s weak law enforcement. The 
government-appointed land owners are abusive, “dictating to farmers what they should 
plant and what prices they can charge for their crops”.14 The owners also pay farmers 
extremely low wages and sell their products at well below market prices. International aid 
companies, such as the International Monetary Fund, have proposed to take farmers’ land 
away and give it to companies to cover debts.15 Such suggestions are ill-advised and 
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 promote agricultural insufficiency; stepping further away from total privatization hinders 
the industry’s ability to cater to local and regional food needs  
Unfortunately, struggles remain even for those farmers who are able to take full 
ownership of their land. Domestic manufacturers pay 10% more than foreign companies 
for state-grown cotton. A local manufacturer pays “…$1,056 per ton, as opposed to $948 
per ton of raw cotton sent abroad for processing”.16 Thus, local manufacturers are at a 
disadvantage when trying to buy cotton in Tajikistan. To make the problem worse, trade 
restrictions and closed borders with Uzbekistan give both local farmers and 
manufacturers few options outside of trading with each other. While this situation may 
seem to benefit farmers by allowing them to charge somewhat high prices for their 
cotton, it has resulted in the closure of some factories due to high costs.17 This leaves 
factory workers unemployed and farmers with surplus cotton.  
Another dilemma afflicting private farmers is the lack of access to good credit. It 
is estimated that “…up to 90% of private farms in Tajikistan have developed a 
dependency on…loan sharking operations”.18 By the end of 2005, collective cotton farms 
and private farmers owed upwards of $220 million mainly to Swiss investors. This 
amount is equivalent to over 150% of annual cotton revenue.19 In addition to interest-
heavy loan programs, authorities gave private farmers a share of the debt that had been 
owed by the collective farms they took over.20 Loan difficulties give the farming industry 
little hope of running debt free in the foreseeable future unless international aid offers 
funding. However, unlike the capital-heavy aluminum and hydroelectricity industries 
farming does not attract a significant degree of attention from foreign investors.  
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 Aluminum 
  
The only significant money-making enterprise that survived the civil war was the 
aluminum smelter located in Tursunzade. The smelter does, however, require much repair 
to reach full efficiency.21 Whereas aluminum production exceeded 500,000 tons per year 
during Soviet times, the plant produced only 380,000 tons in 2005.22 While it is far below 
potential output, this number should be viewed in a positive light considering 183,000 
tons were produced in 1997. This plant is one of Tajikistan’s top earners of foreign 
money, making it maintenance a top priority for Tajikistan’s government. Rahmonov’s 
attention, however, is more likely focused on the hydroelectricity sector, as that 
industry’s money making possibilities are immense.     
 
Hydroelectricity 
  
Tajikistan’s potential for hydroelectricity production is the greatest of the Central 
Asian states and one of the greatest in the world. Between 1950 and 1985 hydroelectricity 
prompted the Tajikistani GDP to grow 13.5-fold.23 Yet as of 2005, the annual output was 
less than 5% of the nation’s capacity.24 During the time of the Soviet Union, plans for 
many large irrigation systems and hydroelectric plants were envisioned. However, most 
of these plans were left undone at the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the personnel 
who developed them largely left the country. Currently, international aid, mainly from 
Russia and Iran, is helping to finish the construction of hydroelectric plants that could 
significantly boost Tajikistan’s ability to produce adequate electricity for its own use and 
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 for sale in other countries. Hydroelectricity is possibly Tajikistan’s most practical 
investment since “...supplies are much higher than the republic’s own needs, while the 
country has no industrial deposits of oil and gas, and it is very unprofitable to develop the 
nation’s coal fields”.25 The construction of new plants is very expensive, but electric 
independence appears a worthwhile investment. 
 Currently, Iran and Russia are the only two nations actively supporting 
Tajikistan’s hydroelectricity development. For example, on April 12, 2006, Russian 
conglomerate Unified Energy Systems (UES) announced that contractors would speed up 
construction to meet deadlines for the completion of the Sangtuda-1 plant. The plant, 
which is set to be completed in 2009, will cost UES approximately $500 million to 
construct. However, the company’s investment will buy it a 75% share in the power 
plant.26 Much of Russia’s investment in Tajikistan has come by way of hydroelectricity 
development. Russia itself possesses about one quarter of the world’s water resources and 
has recently pressed for the creation of a Eurasian hydropower association. The nation 
seeks to dominate the Central Asian water tap in order to someday gain revenues from 
the Chinese and Indian markets.27 
 Iran is also pouring millions of dollars into Tajikistan’s hydroelectricity sector, 
reportedly spending a total of $700 million to complete the Sangtuda-2 power plant.28 
This plant is the larger sister plant to the Russian-funded Sangtuda-1. The Middle-Eastern 
nation is working on a number of massive projects, mainly in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. 
 Perhaps most ambitious is the decision of Russian entity RUSAL to complete the 
Rogun dam and power plant. RUSAL is an aluminum company with apparent 
connections to the Kremlin.29 The corporation has agreed to spend upwards of $1 billion 
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 to complete the dam, which was left unfinished from the Soviet era. The initial plans 
called for the completion of a 335 meter tall dam, which would be the world’s highest.30 
The hydroelectricity plant at Rogun would be capable of producing twice as much 
electricity as Tajikistan’s current largest producer.31 The dam’s completion, which is not 
set for over five years, would give Russia a firm grip on the Central Asian water supply.  
 While many projects in hydroelectricity have begun, the government needs to 
foster a transparent policy environment in which foreign contributors will be willing to 
place extensive funds. Also, to make the distribution of electricity to Tajikistan and its 
neighbors efficient, pipelines and electric grids must receive serious investment. 
Currently, the northern part of the country, located in the Ferghana Valley, has no access 
to electricity produced in southern plants. Thus, this region must get 85% of its electricity 
from Uzbekistan.32 In addition to these problems, the attention on building new facilities 
has led to the neglect of older hydropower plants. Over $600 million needs to be spent to 
repair and maintain the country’s current facilities. Although these difficulties are 
pressing and, if ignored, will interfere with the smooth development of Tajikistani 
hydropower, the construction of large hydropower plants is nonetheless a positive step 
for Tajikistan’s economy. Upon their completion many jobs will be created for 
Tajikistanis currently working in Kazakhstan and Russia. 
 
Migrant Workers 
  
The situation involving migrant workers traveling from Tajikistan to, for the most 
part, Russia, presents a double-edged sword for the nation’s economy. On one hand, the 
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 estimated one million workers employed abroad each year send home remittances that are 
vital to the survival of their families.33 The remittances routinely total over $600 million 
per year, which amounts to about three times the state budget.34 This number also makes 
up at least 20% of the nation’s yearly GDP.35 Thus, migrant workers play a huge role in 
the economic well-being of many Tajikistani citizens. 
 While these numbers are encouraging, the migrant worker situation imposes many 
negative effects on the nation as well. To start, the phenomenon creates a drain of skilled 
workers in Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s fragile farming industry is plagued by inefficiency as 
most young, skilled workers choose to travel to Russia or Kazakhstan to work for better 
wages. The already vulnerable farms are forced to employ second-rate workers, 
furthering their troubles and giving little relief to their debt.36 In addition to creating 
troubles on farms, foreign employment attracts much of the base of young potential 
teachers.37 Migrant workers have also become involved in drug trafficking, thus souring 
their relationship with Russia. The Kremlin recently spoke of implementing stricter 
border enforcements that would prevent much of the foreign workforce from entering the 
country.38 The ability to close its borders to Tajikistani workers has given Russia 
“...tremendous negotiating leverage”.39 If the Kremlin does decide to tighten either the 
registration regulations at its borders, or another aspect of the free crossing of its borders, 
“...the political situation in Tajikistan would be severely affected”.40 Although many 
troubles stem from the migration of workers, its ability to supply Tajikistan’s citizens 
with money is extremely valuable. If Russian borders were closed due to drug smuggling 
Tajikistanis would have few options for sufficient employment.  
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 Drug Trade 
  
Drug trafficking has overwhelmed Tajikistan since Afghanistan’s poppy growing 
industry moved near the two nations’ border. There is, perhaps, no other issue that so 
damages Tajikistan’s relationships with other nations, it’s image to the world, and the 
state of its economy. With the overwhelming bulk of illegal drugs entering from the 
southern border with Afghanistan, the greatest concentration of narcotics are carried 
along the road running northeast from Dushanbe into southern Kyrgyzstan. They then 
pass through to Kazakhstan and on to the Russian market. Some 100 tons of heroin pass 
through Tajikistan each year according to United Nations (UN) estimates.41 With such a 
massive amount of heroin passing through Tajikistan’s borders, the drug trade is linked to 
between 30% and 50% of the nation’s economic activity, with the latter being more 
likely.42 Though some argue that much of Tajikistan’s commercial recovery since the 
civil war is due to the drug trade, trafficking is hardly desirable for the economy.43 The 
narcotics trade “undermines the political will for economic reform and corrupts 
government institutions”.44 The trade is so detrimental to the economy not only because 
of its corrupting power, but also because little of the income is spent on productive 
capital investment and none of it, by nature, is taxed. Thus, up to 50% of the economic 
activity in the nation is spent in unproductive ways and gains no tax revenue for the 
financially unstable government.  
 As of the turn of the century, some local observers suggested the drug trafficking 
problem was eclipsing radical Islamic activity as Tajikistan’s top security threat. The 
validity of this point is confirmed by the social issues stemming from the today’s drug 
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 trade. The nation is experiencing drastic increases in local heroine addicts, as well as the 
spread of HIV/AIDS, a disease that was rarely seen anywhere in Central Asia a decade 
ago.45 Furthermore, an astounding amount of government corruption is believed to 
revolve around the drug trade industry. The 2004 arrest of Tajikistan’s Drug Czar, 
Ghaffor Mirzoyev, epitomizes this vice.46 Such occurrences elicit distrust from citizens of 
the nation and do little to convince the international community that Tajikistan’s 
government is a legitimate recipient of aid. Surprisingly, the Tajik Drug Control Agency 
(TDCA) is regarded as a very professional organization that, with the help of Russian 
border guards, has been making progress in the fight against trafficking. However, the 
TDCA is undermanned and under-funded and in recent years has been able to seize only 
about 10% of total drug activity coming through Tajikistan.47 Put simply, drug trafficking 
has grown into a major concern for Tajikistan’s government and its citizens and unless 
substantial foreign or non-governmental organization (NGO) aid is allocated to help stop 
the flow of heroine across Tajikistan’s borders the problem will persist and worsen. 
International aid would not only keep drugs from crossing into major markets, but would 
also allow Tajikistan to spend money currently supporting border control and narcotics 
regulation on neglected areas such as education and poverty.   
 
Education 
 
Along with the drain of skilled individuals to Russia, the education system is to 
blame for the lack of reliable and well-trained workers in Tajikistan. Unfortunately, given 
the current condition of education in the country “the skill level of the workforce seems 
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 certain to deteriorate even further”.48 Since the end of the Soviet era, the enrollment of 
15-18 year olds in school dropped from 40% to 23%. This rate places Tajikistan evenly 
with Moldova as the post-Soviet state with the lowest percentage of high-school age 
children attending school.49 The current state of the education system puts the country’s 
youth in danger of being less educated than their parents. Schools not only suffer from 
insufficient educational supplies, but often lack the basic necessities of any facility 
accommodating human life. A quarter of schools in Tajikistan lack heating, a quarter lack 
a water supply and a third lack toilets.50 Over 50% of the nation’s schools require capital 
investment and, while the number of high school age children has increased, the amount 
of spots in classrooms has decreased.51 In a few years, if the school system continues to 
lose teachers, “...50% of the country’s children will be illiterate, while the other 50% will 
be insufficiently educated”.52 In order to solve this problem, international aid is required. 
The government in Tajikistan is reluctant to spend money on education as much of their 
resources are taken by a crippling drug trade and a very costly, yet necessary, 
hydroelectricity system. Oddly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) advised that, to 
reduce the risk of inflation, the government should reduce the number of teachers in 
secondary schools by about 100,000.53 International organizations who are capable of 
providing aid, such as the IMF, must take into account that nations with unstable 
economies and insufficient education are breeding grounds for Islamic radicalism. It is in 
the best interests not only of the forthcoming generation of Tajikistanis, but also of the 
international community, to help improve the school system in Tajikistan. If citizens are 
educated early and well, they will be less likely to become delinquent, unemployed, or 
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 involved with drugs. These developments would make Tajikistan’s affairs with some of 
its closest neighboring countries considerably less problematic. 
 
International Relations 
  
While the status of Tajikistan’s relationships with Uzbekistan, Iran, and Russia is 
quite unique, each has, or could potentially have a great impact on the Tajikistani 
economy. Also to be noted, Tajikistan has had substantial contact with both China and 
the United States in recent years. However, despite their potential to do so, neither of 
these nations has had a significant economic effect on Tajikistan as of yet. 
 
Uzbekistan 
  
If Tajikistan could choose only one nation to improve its relations with, 
Uzbekistan would be first on the list. Unlike the other nations to be discussed in this 
section, Uzbekistan has been nothing but troublesome to Tajikistan, both socially and 
economically. Uzbekistan is also the only nation to be discussed in this section that 
shares a border with Tajikistan—a border that has become a very heated subject. 
 Uzbekistan claims that its closed-border policy with Tajikistan is due to the 
inability of Rahmonov and the Tajikistani government to effectively deal with Islamic 
radicalism in the Ferghana Valley.54 However, a more subtle agenda, which includes 
keeping Tajikistani goods out of the Uzbek market, is widely suspected. The unstable 
behavior of Uzbekistan regarding the border has caused great disturbances in the 
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 Tajikistani economy due to Tajikistan’s previous reliance on Uzbekistan’s roads and 
railways for trade and travel. Due to the lack of a reliable road from Dushanbe to 
Khujand in the north, residents from the northern areas of the nation previously traveled 
through Uzbekistan to reach the airport in the capital city. However, Uzbekistan’s closed 
border now forces Tajikistanis from the Ferghana Valley to make a four to five hour 
drive to Batken’s airport in Kyrgyzstan.55 In addition to complicating travel plans, the 
border closure causes great strain on the Tajikistani market. During Soviet times, over 
80% of goods from Tajikistan were shipped by freight through Uzbekistan. Now, a much 
more arduous route into Kyrgyzstan must be taken. This also results in the sale of Tajik 
goods in the very competitive market in Kyrgyzstan.56 Imports, such as natural gas, are 
also affected negatively by Uzbekistan’s border policy. The problem became so severe 
that in 2004, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan held talks of building a gas pipeline through 
northern Afghanistan in order to avoid Uzbekistan.57 Natural gas continues to be a 
contested issue for the two nations. In 2006 Uzbekistan cut off gas shipments to the 
Ferghana Valley region of Tajikistan under the premise that Tajikistan was late on 
payments for earlier shipments.58 Tajikistan, however claims that they owe over $4 
million less than what was requested by Uzbekistan. In an act of retaliation, Tajikistan 
blocked shipments of gas from western Uzbekistan to eastern Uzbekistan.59 Border issues 
between the two nations continue to be hostile, with neither showing any signs of ending 
the quarrels.   
 Uzbekistan also ardently opposes recent developments in Tajikistan’s 
hydroelectric sector. Under agreements made in the Soviet era, “…Uzbekistan and other 
downstream states receive water from Tajikistan at almost no charge in order to meet 
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 their substantial irrigation needs”.60 Uzbekistani authorities have long feared the 
development of Tajikistan’s hydroelectric sector would jeopardize the water supply to 
those downstream. RUSAL, the Russian company contracted to complete Tajikistan’s 
Rogun dam and power plant, has recently been influenced by Uzbekistan. Immediately 
after a meeting between RUSAL’s chief Oleg Deripaska and Uzbekistan’s President 
Karimov, “…the Russian company revised its dam plans, saying it wanted to build a 280-
meter tall dam, instead of one 335 meters tall as originally planned”.61 Uzbekistan’s 
influence on the international community is perhaps a greater threat to Tajikistan’s 
economy than border closures and trade restrictions. Tajikistanis are fortunate that other 
foreign nations, such as Iran and Russia, do not deal with them so negatively.  
 
Iran 
 
Tajikistan’s relations with Iran sharply contrast those with Uzbekistan. While 
only a few years ago Iran kept its distance from Tajikistan—due mainly to the majority of 
Tajikistan’s population claiming Sunni Islam as opposed to the Shiism practiced in 
Iran—the nations have now forged a powerful friendship. Tajikistan and Iran share 
historical connections which are exemplified by their common Persian dialects. This link 
is distinctive between the two, as the other Central Asian nations speak Turkic languages. 
Lately, much fraternal speech has been exchanged between these nations describing their 
relationship to one another. In a July 2006 press conference, Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad proclaimed, “We should have everything in common—economy, culture 
and art; the frontiers dividing us should be eliminated”.62 Tajikistan’s administration has 
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 been receptive of Ahmadinejad’s warmth, however they are aware of the risk of the 
Iranians pursuing a hidden agenda of cultural and ideological exportation.  
All talk of culture aside; Iran has invested much in Tajikistan’s economy, most 
notably in the hydroelectric sector. As mentioned above in the Hydroelectricity section, 
Iran has invested a total of $700 million in the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric plant.63 Perhaps 
more noteworthy is Iran’s commitment to build a tunnel linking Dushanbe and Khujand. 
The project has a price tag of $180 million and would eventually turn into a road linking 
China to the Persian Gulf.64 The road project is especially significant in that, upon its 
completion, it will alleviate much of the turmoil plaguing trade and travel from the 
Ferghana Valley to Dushanbe. Iran’s investment in Tajikistan, despite possibly allowing 
Iranian ideologies to infiltrate the Tajikistani nation, is a positive development that was 
unforeseen half a decade ago. However, whatever degree of influence Iran manages to 
grain over Tajikistan through heavy spending and friendly language will likely be viewed 
as an afterthought to Russia’s tight grasp. 
 
Russia 
  
Russia possesses the ability to dictate the success or failure of Tajiksian’s 
economy to an unmatched degree. Though independent for over 15 years, Tajikistan still 
relies on Russia in a number of ways. Moscow has a hand in Tajikistani hydropower, 
deploys permanent troops in Tajikistan, and through means of migrant workers and trade, 
supplies Tajikistan with a significant portion of its GDP. This is all quite understandable, 
as “there is no post-Soviet state, the political and intellectual elite of which is as pro-
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 Russian as it is in Tajikistan”.65 Nearly all of Tajikistan’s political and public figures 
were educated in Russia or other Union republics, and there is no one in top positions of 
government who has a good grasp of English. Thus, Tajikistan’s outlook on the West is 
largely constructed by Russia’s media.66 Despite the attempts of nations such as Iran to 
build strong ties with Tajikistan, it is, for the moment, Russia’s nation.  
 Russian investment in hydropower is welcomed and even planned for in 
Tajikistan. President Rahmonov stated in early 2006 that “strategic cooperation with 
Russia remains Tajikistan’s foreign policy priority”.67 Russian work on the Rogun dam, 
the Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric plant, and the Tursunzade Aluminum plant is underway and 
set to be completed within the decade. Significant profits are expected from these 
ventures, as the companies investing are each set to receive a large share of the earnings. 
Also, Russia’s keen interest in Tajikistan’s hydroelectricity is bolstered by the planned 
construction of large aluminum plants in its own southern regions. While Russia is 
currently seeking hydroelectric power in Tajikistan for its own use and for sale to 
Afghanistan, Moscow is known to desire eventual access to Chinese and Indian 
markets.68 Though the hydropower plants in Tajikistan are of much gain to Russia, they 
nonetheless will help Tajikistan gain electrical independence and economic stability in 
the long run. 
 Russian influence in Tajikistan is unlikely to be replaced or even compromised 
anytime in the near future. With the 201st division deployed in Tajikistan, Russia’s 
physical presence is symbolic of its control over the nation. Also, Tajikistani migrant 
workers in Russia give Moscow a great deal of leverage when dealing with Dushanbe. 
Tajikistan simply cannot continue to run without economic support from Russia. 
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Suggestions for Action 
 
Tajikistan’s economy, though improving, remains very weak and is insufficient to 
keep the majority of its citizens out of poverty. The nation is still expected to be the 
poorest in the Central Asian region in 2015, with over a third of its population living 
below the poverty line.69 In addition to the ongoing improvements in the hydropower and 
drug-control sectors there are a few specific measures that, if taken both by Tajikistan 
and the international community, could bring significant progress in the next decade. 
 
Keeping ties with Russia Strong. Remittances offer the best opportunity for reducing 
individual debt and pulling families out of poverty. As Russia has complete control over 
the destiny of Tajikistan’s migrant workers, it is important that Tajikistan continues to 
work closely with Moscow. This includes strengthening ongoing efforts to improve 
control over drug trafficking. However, as improvements are made to roads and other 
means of transportation in Tajikistan, the narcotics industry will become even more 
difficult to suppress.  
 
Working to Introduce a More Transparent Government. In order to be viewed with 
respect by the international community, Rahmonov must clean up the actions of his 
administration. Relations with Uzbekistan are tense, and will only worsen if more 
corruption in the Tajikistani government is exposed. Also, NGOs and Foreign nations 
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 will be, as they have been in recent years, reluctant to give money to a government with 
inaccurate reports of earnings, tax collections, and other financial information. 
 
Using Aid to its Fullest Potential. While forgiving debt and giving money directly to the 
government resemble acceptable actions, the international community must be more 
responsible in its awarding of aid to Tajikistan. Rather than forgiving debt, foreign 
nations and international banks might defer loans, while investing in the human capital in 
Tajikistan. If education and health services are given adequate funding, the nation will 
eventually be able to pull itself out of debt, rather than be pulled out.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 A union of religious radicalism, governmental instability, and social unrest has 
resulted in war, suffering, and international distrust in many of Tajikistan’s neighboring 
countries. While an economic revival would not provide the poverty stricken state 
complete immunity to the woes plaguing its region, increased prosperity would 
undoubtedly improve the lives of countless Tajikistanis from a humanitarian standpoint. 
Indeed, Western ignorance—or, at the very least, indifference—to the social, economic, 
and political situations existing in countless poor nations has contributed to unchecked 
terrorism and unaided suffering. The Tajikistani economy may appear insignificant when 
the scope of the global marketplace is considered, however the implications of its 
successes and failures are vast.  
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